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Abstract
The legal environment is one important determinant of corporate governance.
However, within legal families, also cultural differences can explain the level of
corporate governance to some extent. We analyze this relationship for the case of
Switzerland. Swiss firms are mainly located in two cultural areas, the German and
French speaking parts of Switzerland. Swiss federal law is equal in both regions
which allows us to investigate the effect of cultural differences on corporate gover-
nance. Although we only find few differences, we observe that board composition
is significantly driven by language-related factors: French-speaking directors are
prevalent in Swiss French boards and German-speaking directors in Swiss German
boards. More importantly, however, boards of these two parts of Switzerland are
more likely to be structured as in their respective neighboring countries. Further-
more, in the French part, transfer restrictions of shares are more common.
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Investors are legally protected from severe misconduct by managers (e.g., by the duty
of care and duty of loyalty). In addition, corporate governance reduces the scope of fur-
ther wrong managerial behavior. Hence, the legal environment is one important de-
terminant of practices in corporate governance. In a series of papers, La Porta et al.
(1998, 2000) show that investor protection differs significantly among countries. Com-
mon law countries are typically associated with a higher level of investor protection than
civil law countries. Lower investor protection is related to a higher ownership concen-
tration and weaker financial markets. Some shareholders may also protect themselves
by accumulating significant voting rights and monitor the management more strictly by
themselves. However, these large shareholders may extract private benefits of control if
investor protection is low.1 In such situations, the conflict between controlling and mi-
nority shareholders may be more severe than the classical agency conflict between man-
agers and shareholders. The empirical evidence of La Porta et al. (2000) also suggests
that the legal system has an influential impact on corporate governance: legal families
are differently capable to protect investors from managers and/or other shareholders.
However, academic researchers debate whether the legal system is the one and only
determinant of corporate governance. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) allege that the initial
ownership structure in an economy defines further developments in corporate gover-
nance. They argue that path dependencies may explain why private benefits of control
(and ownership concentration) are still higher in some countries than in others. Aguilera
and Jackson (2003) assume that countries adopt best practices of corporate governance
that fit their specific institutional environment. The studies suggest that historical cir-
cumstances, too, influence corporate governance.
Thus, the affiliation to a legal family (e.g., civil or common law) and the legal enforce-
ment may not be the only determinant of corporate governance or the development of the
financial markets. For instance, Djankov et al. (2008) suppose that the strong financial
market in Switzerland is a result of factors they probably missed, because the standard
of Swiss investor protection is not especially high in terms of international standards.
A country’s culture may be another factor that influences corporate governance. In-
deed, Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that the prevalence and level of private benefits
of control (used as a direct proxy for investor protection) is also influenced by cultural
norms within a country and not solely a result of low investor protection. Legal mech-
anisms (e.g., accounting standards), but also extra-legal mechanisms such as pressure
coming from the public opinion curb the level of private benefits. Shareholders fear nega-
tive public opinion and reputation costs if the media uncover bad behavior. They conclude
that apart from the legal system, cultural aspects influence the way how investors are
1Private benefits of control can arise in addition to shared benefits of control (benefits for controlling and
non-controlling shareholders, e.g., stock price increases) for the controlling shareholder (e.g., consumption
of perquisites or prestige) (Dyck and Zingales, 2004).
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being protected. Licht et al. (2005) find further empirical evidence that culture has a
significant impact on corporate governance-related law.2 Hence, the link between own-
ership concentration, private benefits of control, corporate governance, and the legal
system is not undisputed. Factors different from the affiliation to a certain legal family
do also influence the firm’s governance. Cultural differences within legal families among
countries and within countries hence do potentially drive the structure of corporate gov-
ernance.
We examine the impact of cultural differences — in contrast to the legal system —
on corporate governance. Switzerland offers an interesting research opportunity, be-
cause Swiss firms are located in two main cultural areas: German-speaking and French-
speaking Switzerland. These two areas are culturally influenced by their closest neigh-
bors: France and Germany which are two important economies in Continental Europe
that have distinct cultural peculiarities. In contrast to the United States where state
law can significantly differ, the federal law fully defines corporate law in Switzerland.3
Hence, the legal system is the same in both regions and, in turn, differences in corpo-
rate governance may be explained by culture.4 Therefore, our study compares corporate
governance of Swiss French and Swiss German firms. The analysis investigates the dif-
ferences in ownership structures, takeover defenses, boards of directors as well as char-
acteristics of directors, chief executive officers (CEOs), and firms. Significant differences
in corporate governance suggest that culture might play a role.
1 Literature Review
The corporate landscape of Switzerland is roughly divided into the French and the Ger-
man part of Switzerland.5 Because of strong cultural influences from their neighbors,
it is important to discuss shortly the systems of corporate governance of France and
Germany.
The legal systems of France and Germany are based on civil law. La Porta et al. (2000)
show that investor protection is weaker in countries with civil law of French origin and
2Their "corporate governance law" is based on the "anti-director rights index" and the "creditor rights
index" applied by La Porta et al. (2000).
3Cantonal law differs in some cases (e.g., tax law) and law enforcement is usually in the responsibility
of the 26 cantons.
4In a similar approach, Bozec et al. (2008) and Boubraki et al. (2011) show that Canadian firms in
the French-speaking province of Québec have a higher ownership concentration than firms in the other
(English-speaking) provinces. However, Québec firms, unlike Swiss firms, can choose to incorporate under
the Canadian federal law (based on common law) or the Québec provincial law (based on civil law). They
reveal that the incorporation under the civil-law regime is significantly positively related to the ownership
concentration. Therefore, they confirm that the legal system is an important determinant of the ownership
concentration.
5Only very few public companies are located in the other two cultural areas of Switzerland: Italian and
Rhaeto-Romansch.
3
stronger in common-law countries, e.g., Anglo-Saxon countries. The German civil law
system lies in between. Similarly, the private benefits of control are higher in legal
systems of French origin than in Germanic legal systems (see Dyck and Zingales, 2004).6
Switzerland’s legal system belongs to the German-type of civil law.
The corporate governance in each country is not only aimed at meeting the interests
of shareholders, but also those of other stakeholders (e.g., debtholders, employees or
government). In France, state interference in the economy is not uncommon ("dirigism").
By contrast, in Germany, there tend to be close ties to the banks which is referred to as
the "Hausbankensystem" (La Porta et al., 2000).
The ownership structure in both countries is relatively concentrated compared to
Anglo-Saxon countries where ownership is usually dispersed: 65 percent of all listed
firms (70 percent of all listed non-financial firms) in France and Germany are controlled
by families.7
The market for corporate control is not very important in Germany and France. This
may be linked to these societies’ attitudes towards hostile takeovers. As an example, the
former president of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, Franz Müntefering, has
called activist investors "Heuschrecken" (grasshoppers) that erode the industrial land-
scape (Brost, 2005). In this way, he backed the target firm’s management and agitated
against corporate restructuring. In France, the state has also directly intervened in
some cases of takeovers. For instance, preemptive media pressure accompanied a poten-
tial takeover of Danone by Pepsi. Also, Suez and GDF were merged into a French energy
giant to make a takeover more expensive. And the state (unsuccessfully) intervened into
the Arcelor-Mittal deal (see The Economist, 2006).
The board of directors has distinct features. The French board of directors can be
structured as being either one-tiered or two-tiered. The one-tiered board is often con-
trolled by the chairman and CEO in one person. Two-tiered boards consist of a supervi-
sory board which is strictly separated from the management board (see Hopt and Leyens,
2004).8 In Germany, the two-tier board structure is mandatory.9 Hence, the monitoring
function of the German-style board is important. The Swiss corporate law, as in France,
does not mandate a specific board structure.
In general, the Swiss corporate governance is closer to the Anglo-Saxon system. As
argued in literature, the main objective of most firms is to increase the shareholders’
wealth (Wymeersch, 1998). Furthermore, the financial market in Switzerland is more
6However, the mix of countries in the respective legal system tends to influence the private benefits of
control.
7Control is defined as having 20 percent or more of voting rights (see Faccio and Lang, 2002).
8In France, one-tiered boards are called "conseils d’administration" and are commonly controlled by the
"président-directeur-générale" (or short: "PDG"). Two-tier boards consist of the "conseil de surveillance"
and the "directoire".
9In Germany, the supervisory board is called "Aufsichtsrat" and the management board is denoted
"Vorstand".
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important with respect to the ratio of the total market value of equity to the gross do-
mestic product than in France and Germany (4.01, 1.30, 0.72, respectively).10 As another
feature, Swiss firms do rely on large-scale exports and quite often produce worldwide. As
a result, the corporate governance of both Swiss German and Swiss French firms may
be adopted to international standards. Anyhow, specific differences caused by cultural
factors may still persist.
2 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analyses examines differences in the corporate governance between firms
incorporated in the German- and the French-speaking part of Switzerland. The sample
consists of 163 firms of which 136 (83 percent) are located in German-speaking Switzer-
land, while 27 firms (17 percent) are located in the Swiss French area. We exclude regu-
lated industries (utilities and banks) as well as financial services. The former tend to be
influenced by other factors than culture and the latter exhibit an incomparable corporate
structure. In addition, the four firms from the Italian part (of which two are utilities) are
excluded from the analysis, as well.
The significances of differences are measured using t-tests for the equality of means
and Wilcoxon rank sum-tests for the equality of medians. The medians are integrated,
because otherwise the results may be influenced by outliers.
2.1 Ownership Structure
The ownership structure of an economy is an important factor in corporate governance
and shapes the agency relationships within the firms. While in Anglo-Saxon countries
corporations are mostly widely held, in the rest of the world, including Switzerland,
many firms are controlled by one important shareholder, e.g, a family. Such blockholders
own significant voting rights exceeding the disclosure threshold of three percent. We
analyze the overall ownership structure, the existence of shareholder agreements, the
type of the largest investors, and the nationality of investors. The origin of shareholders
may be important since they may have specific investment preferences. For instance, U.S.
institutional investors may invest in firms with high standards of U.S.-style corporate
governance, and German or French shareholders may prefer to invest in firms that are
culturally close.
Table I indicates that strong differences in the ownership structure do not exist with
both, t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum-test, being significant. However, as a sole finding,
the largest shareholder in Swiss German firms more often is an individual. Hence, the
10Source: "CIA - The World Factbook"; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/.
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results suggest that the ownership structure emerged rather from legal or historical
conditions than from cultural differences.
Table I: The table presents comparisons of ownership structures between Swiss German and Swiss French
firms. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-test with continuity correction and
the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. "Yes" is denoted y and "no" is denoted n.
Sample Swiss German Swiss French
Observations 163 136 27
in % 100 83 17
t-test/
Mean Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon-test)
Panel A: Ownership Structure
Number of blockholders (count) 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.0
Cumulated ownership (in %) 46.2 45.6 46.1 49.6 51.6
Shareholder agreement (y=1,n=0) (in %) 16.0 15.4 — 18.5 —
Majority shareholder (y=1,n=0) (in %) 29.5 27.2 — 40.7 —
Panel B: Largest Shareholders (in %)
Largest shareholder ownership 31.9 31.1 24.7 35.4 29.2
Type of the largest shareholder:
- family (y=1,n=0) 24.5 22.1 — 37.0 —
- individual (y=1,n=0) 29.5 32.4 — 14.8 — **/(*)
- state (y=1,n=0) 2.5 2.9 — 0.0 — ** / (-)
- industry firm (y=1,n=0) 14.7 12.5 — 25.9 — - / (*)
Second largest shareholder ownership 6.7 6.7 5.3 6.8 6.7
Panel C: Nationality of Shareholders (in %)
Local investors 32.4 31.9 26.0 34.7 29.2
U.S. institutional shareholders 2.2 2.4 0.0 1 0.0 ** / (-)
German shareholders 2.9 3.2 0.0 1.8 0.0
French shareholders 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 - / (***)
2.2 Takeover Defenses
The market for corporate control is a particularly important governance mechanism in
countries with a strong financial market, namely the United States. However, hostile
takeovers are frequently accompanied by critics of the media and politicians. Thus, cul-
tural norms are important in explaining to what extent the use of devices that lower the
probability of a successful hostile takeover (or any forced corporate restructuring) are
accepted by society. We include three takeover defenses that tend to decouple the voting
from the cash flow rights: multiple classes of shares, transfer restrictions of (registered)
shares ("Vinkulierung"), and voting restrictions.
Multiple classes of shares typically allow one group of shareholders to get control over
the firm, e.g., by issuing non-voting shares. In the case of a transfer restriction, the board
of the firm can decide whether a shareholder is entered into the company share register
6
or not and with how many shares. Only registered shareholders, in the case of registered
shares ("Namenaktien"), do have voting rights (see Dubs and Wieser, 2009). Additionally,
the articles of incorporation may provide voting rights restrictions (e.g., at 5 percent) for
registered and bearer shares.11 The takeover defenses ("clauses on changes of control")
include measures such as severance payments (see Directive on Information relating to
Corporate Governance, 7.2., SIX Exchange, 2008). As another important takeover de-
fense discussed in the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance literature, staggered boards
are included in the analysis. The staggered (or classified) board prevents a board ma-
jority (and the control over the firm) from being replaced at only one general assembly
since typically only one third of the board is replaced at once. However, in Switzerland,
shareholders are usually able to dismiss directors at any shareholders’ meeting. Finally,
firms can opt out of the obligation that the acquirer has to make a tender offer. In this
case, minority shareholders are not able to tender their shares if they do not want to stay
invested when the control structure changes significantly.
Table II shows that also the differences in the prevalence of takeover defenses are
rare. However, Swiss French firms are more likely to be protected against hostile takeovers
by transfer restrictions of shares, while Swiss German firms installed staggered (or clas-
sified) boards against unwelcome investors. This result suggests also that registered
shares (French: "actions nominatives") are more frequently issued by Swiss French com-
panies.
Table II: The table presents comparisons of takeover defenses between Swiss German and Swiss French
firms. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-test with continuity correction and
the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. "Yes" is denoted y and "no" is denoted n.
Sample Swiss German Swiss French
Observations 163 136 27
in % 100 83 17
t-test/
Mean Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon-test)
Takeover defenses (y=1,n=0) (in %) 30.7 30.2 — 33.3 —
Multiple classes of equity (y=1,n=0) (in %) 19.6 17.7 — 29.6 —
Transfer restrictions (y=1,n=0) (in %) 64.4 61.0 — 81.5 — ** / (**)
Voting restrictions (y=1,n=0) (in %) 27.0 26.5 — 29.6 —
Staggered board (y=1,n=0) (in %) 53.4 56.6 — 37.0 — * / (*)
Opting out (y=1,n=0) (in %) 16.5 16.9 — 14.8 —
11Such voting caps are legal in Germany and France and it is also possible to issue two classes of equity
(even though it is very rare in France, around 3 percent) (Faccio and Lang, 2002).
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2.3 Board of Directors
The board of directors is an important governance device. Directors are elected by share-
holders and their duty is to ensure that the firm is led in the company’s best interests.
We investigate the overall structure of the board and the characteristics of its directors.
In Table III, the general board structure (i.e., one-tier or two-tier, leadership structure,
board size, board ownership and compensation) and the board mechanisms (i.e., com-
mittees, meetings, and re-election terms) are analyzed. One-tier boards are defined as
boards having at least one executive director on the board and two-tier boards are boards
without any directors who are executives of the firm at the same time. Table III shows
that the structure of the board and also the board mechanisms are quite similar, however,
with one important exception: Swiss German boards are more likely to be two-tiered.
The boards are structured in the same way as in Germany, i.e., the board of directors is
strictly separated from the management boards. In other words, the board of directors
consists of no executive directors at all. In contrast, half of the Swiss French boards
comprise the chief executive officer (CEO).
As a robustness check, we estimate a Probit model of board structure (1 = one-tier
board, 0 = two-tier board) with FRA as its main explanatory variable equaling 1 if the
firm is located in the Swiss French part (and 0 if it is located in the Swiss German part)
along with sales growth (SGR), board ownership (BOWN), and industry affiliation (IN-
DUSTRY) as control variables. High-growth firms and firms of specific industries (e.g.,
technology-based firms) may rely on a closer leadership structure with executive direc-
tors on their boards. Similarly, higher board ownership suggests an active, eventually
executive, function of the board members. The estimates of the analysis and robust stan-
dard errors, in parentheses, are reported underneath. The analysis shows that firms
in the French-speaking part of Switzerland are significantly more likely to have a one-
tiered board structure than Swiss German firms (on the 5 percent significance level).
Board−Structure i= α0 + β1 FRA i + β2 SGRi + β3 BOWNi + βk INDUSTRYi,k + ²i
0.962** 0.631* 1.051
(0.382) (0.373) (0.690)
The second Table IV on boards compares director characteristics, i.e., professional
and demographic characteristics of the directors. The analysis shows that the compo-
sition of the boards differs as a consequence of language barriers. Directors of French
citizenship and directors graduated from a Swiss French university are represented at
a higher proportion in corporate boards of the Swiss French part. Similarly, German
directors are prevalent in Swiss German boards. Admittedly, the education of a direc-
tor at a Swiss French university does not entirely imply that they are French-speaking.
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For instance, German-speaking directors might certainly have attended a Swiss French
university and vice versa. However, evidence from Switzerland shows that students are
attracted by their most familiar universities. Furthermore, board members of Swiss
German boards have more external (listed) directorships on average.
Table III: The table documents sample characteristics of board of directors of Swiss German and Swiss
French firms. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-test with continuity correction
and the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. Significance at the 1 percent, 5
percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. "Yes" is denoted y and "no" is
denoted n.
Sample Swiss German Swiss French
Observations 163 136 27
in % 100 83 17
t-test/
Mean Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon-test)
Panel A: Board Chracteristics (in %)
One-tiered boards (y=1,n=0) 52.8 49.3 — 70.4 — ** / (**)
CEO is chairman (y=1,n=0) 15.3 14.7 — 18.5 —
CEO is on the board (y=1,n=0) 36.8 33.8 — 51.9 — * / (*)
Board size (count) 6.56 6.51 6.00 6.85 6.00
Board ownership 13.6 13.8 3.6 12.1 3.8
Board compensation (averages) 278,695 278,496 171,600 279,741 182,500
Panel B: Board Workings
Number of committees (count) 1.96 1.98 2.00 1.89 2.00
Hours of board meetings (count) 71.46 71.57 64.00 70.92 67.00
(including committees)
Number of board meetings (count) 6.96 6.98 6.00 6.83 6.00
Age limitation (y=1,n=0) (in %) 45.4 46.3 — 40.7 —
Tenure limitation (y=1,n=0) (in %) 3.1 3.7 — 0.0 — ** / (-)
Single year election (y=1,n=0) (in %) 21.5 16.9 — 44.4 — ** / (***)
2.4 CEO and Firm Characteristics
The next step in our analysis investigates differences in CEO and firm characteristics.
Firstly, debates on corporate governance commonly focus on the CEOs and his decisions,
performance or salary. Table V shows that both, CEOs in Swiss French firms and in
Swiss German firms exhibit the same features (all CEOs are around 52 years old) and
earn very similar amounts on average (CHF 2M).
Secondly, the corporate governance is typically a response to the firm’s operational en-
vironment and is adopted to the firm’s specific situation. Therefore, we examine whether
firm characteristics differ from Swiss German firms to Swiss French firms. If they do,
those factors might have influenced the findings from the comparisons in corporate gover-
nance. The use of the IFRS standard is included in this analysis since stronger account-
ing standards curb private benefits (see Dyck and Zingales, 2004). However, Table VI
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Table IV: The table presents comparisons of director characteristics between Swiss German and Swiss
French firms. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-test with continuity correction
and the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. Significance at the 1 percent, 5
percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Per director is denoted p.d.
Sample Swiss German Swiss French
Observations 163 136 27
in % 100 83 17
t-test/
Mean Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon-test)
Panel A: Director Characteristics (in %)
Lawyers 17.9 18.0 16.7 17.3 14.3
Swiss French university graduates 8.8 5.0 0.0 28.3 25.0 *** / (***)
Foreign university graduates 21.9 21.8 20.0 22.2 14.3
Independent directors 71.9 7.3 75.0 68.7 77.8
Executives 13.3 12.5 0.0 16.9 16.7 - / (*)
Family representatives 7.5 7.0 0.0 9.9 0.0
Shareholder representatives 8.7 9.1 0.0 6.7 0.0
Number of mandates (p.d.) 3.22 3.22 3.00 3.26 3.44
Number of listed directorships (p.d.) 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.26 0.25 *** / (**)
(counts in SPI firms)
Panel B: Board Demography (in %)
Women 4.0 4.1 0.0 3.7 0.0
Foreigners 26.7 26.7 20.0 26.6 22.2
German 8.8 9.5 0.0 5.0 0.0 ** / (-)
French 3.0 2.2 0.0 6.8 0.0 ** / (***)
Anglo-Saxon 6.7 6.4 0.0 8.4 0.0
Board’s average age (years) 57.1 57.1 57.5 57.3 58.0
Board’s average tenure (years) 7.8 7.8 7.0 7.9 7.6
Table V: The table presents comparisons of CEO characteristics between Swiss German and Swiss French
firms. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-test with continuity correction and
the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. "Yes" is denoted y and "no" is denoted n.
Sample Swiss German Swiss French
Observations 163 136 27
in % 100 83 17
t-test/
Mean Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon-test)
Management size (count) 6.35 6.29 6.00 6.67 6.00
CEO compensation (in CHF) 2,048,000 1,991,913 1,077,000 2,325,970 874,000
CEO ownership (in %) 3.4 2.8 0.0 6.5 0.0
CEO age (years) 52.4 52.4 52.0 52.6 52.0
CEO tenure (years) 6.5 6.1 5.0 8.6 6.0
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shows that also the firms do not differ significantly. In either area, industrial goods and
services are the most important industry, but no differences in firm characteristics can
be detected at all.
Table VI: The table presents comparisons of firm characteristics between Swiss German and Swiss French
firms. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-test with continuity correction and
the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. "Yes" is denoted y and "no" is denoted n.
Sample Swiss German Swiss French
Observations 163 136 27
in % 100 83 17
t-test/
Mean Mean Median Mean Median (Wilcoxon-test)
Panel A: Firm Key Figures
Net annual sales (CHF in Millions) 4,157 3,760 505 6,159 285
Sales growth (in %) 20.8 23.5 11.1 7.2 9.5
Diversification (y=1,n=0) 71.8 70.6 — 77.8 —
SMI (y=1,n=0) 10.4 10.3 — 11.1 —
DAR 48.1 48.1 48.8 48.5 50.2
IFRS standard (y=1,n=0) 76.1 75.7 — 77.8 —
Panel B: Three Most Important Industries
Swiss German Swiss French
First industry (in %) Industrial goods & services (28) Industrial goods & services (33)
Second industry (in %) Health care (15) Personal & household goods (15)
Third industry (in %) Technology (12) Media (15)
2.5 Firms Established Before 1989
As a final point of analysis, we compare only firms that were established before 1989,
near the end of the cold war in order to capture a feature of this historic period. Further-
more, in 1992, a new Swiss company law and in 1995, the Stock Exchange Act have been
introduced. We expect such firms to be more closely related to their cultural basis. The
new sample consists of 123 firms which are divided into 101 Swiss German firms and 22
Swiss French firms. Only the variables that indicated a significant difference in the ba-
sis sample are re-examined. However, as Table VII depicts, almost all differences remain
the same after the sample is reduced to firms established before 1989. So, there are no
differences to whether the firm was established before or after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
3 Conclusions
Besides legal or historical reasons, corporate governance could be influenced by cultural
norms. Switzerland offers an excellent research opportunity since firms are mainly lo-
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Table VII: The table presents comparisons of corporate governance between Swiss German and Swiss
French firms established before 1989. The equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum-
test with continuity correction and the equality of means is tested using a Welch Two Sample t-test.
Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
"Yes" is denoted y and "no" is denoted n.
Swiss German Swiss French
Obs 101 22
in % 82 18
t-test/
Mean Mean (Wilcoxon-test)
Swiss French university graduates (in %) 5.2 30.7 *** / (***)
Executives (in %) 11.4 14.6 - / (*)
German on board (in %) 8.8 4.7 * / (-)
French on board (in %) 1.9 6.0 * / (**)
One-tiered boards (y=1,n=0) (in %) 44.6 68.2 ** / (**)
CEO on the board (y=1,n=0) (in %) 29.7 45.5
Number of listed directorships p.d. (count) 0.48 27.00 *** / (**)
Tenure limitation (y=1,n=0) (in %) 4.0 0.0 ** / (-)
Single year election (y=1,n=0) (in %) 15.8 40.9 ** / (***)
Transfer restrictions (y=1,n=0) (in %) 55.4 77.2 ** / (*)
Staggered board (y=1,n=0) (in %) 54.4 36.4
Type of the largest shareholder:
- private investor (y=1,n=0) (in %) 32.7 18.2
- state (y=1,n=0) (in %) 1.0 0.0
- industry firm (y=1,n=0) (in %) 14.9 31.8 - / (*)
U.S. institutional shareholders (in %) 2.1 0.8 **
German shareholders (in %) 2.8 1.4
French shareholders (in %) 0.1 0.9 * / (***)
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cated in two cultural areas: French- and German-speaking Switzerland. Most impor-
tantly, both areas share one and the same federal company law. This allows us to isolate
potential cultural differences. The results indicate that there are no strong structural
differences in the corporate governance between the two regions. Surprisingly, most
figures are almost identical. CEO characteristics and firm characteristics show no dif-
ferences at all. However, there is one strong exception: Swiss German boards are more
likely to be two-tiered. The boards are structured in the same way as in Germany, i.e.,
the board of directors is strictly separated from the management board. In the French
area, the probability of an executive being also a board member is higher.
Differences in the composition of the board and the investor base are most probably
related to language barriers. The boards in the Swiss French part are composed by di-
rectors who have mostly been educated at Swiss French universities. In addition, French
citizens are also more prevalent in Swiss French boards. In contrast, German citizens
are more frequent in Swiss German boards. This also suggests that the (national) mar-
ket for directors is segmented into regions. However, these differences have no impact
on the overall corporate governance. The ownership structure is almost equal. The only
robust difference reveals that individuals are more likely to be the largest investors in
Swiss German firms. Concerning takeover defenses, the two regions have distinct fa-
vorite devices. In the German part, staggered boards are more frequent, while in the
French part, the transfer restriction of registered shares ("Vinkulierung") is an impor-
tant feature. Furthermore, our results are robust to the exclusion of firms that were
established after 1989.
Most factors in corporate governance show no differences. Nevertheless, some impor-
tant factors, notably the overall board structure is related to the cultural region, because
the legal system requires no specific structure. Hence, the legal system or the nation’s
overall identity might have shaped most of Switzerland’s corporate governance. Switzer-
land is often referred to as a country forged by the will of the people ("Willensnation").
However, our analysis is restricted to listed firms that comply with national and interna-
tional corporate governance standards. We don’t know whether cultural differences are
more distinctive in non-listed firms.
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